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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Adams appeals from the judgment entered on the order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and from the denial of
his motion to set aside that judgment.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following testimony and evidence was presented during trial, and is
taken the state’s Respondent’s Brief in Adams’ direct appeal proceeding:
At about 5:00 or 6:00 on the evening of March 10, 2006, three friends,
Mikeal Campbell, James Nelson, and Stephen Maylin, drove with Nelson to the
Dutch Goose bar in Caldwell, where they drank alcohol until they met a friend of
Campbell’s, Tyler Gorley, at about 7:30 or 8:00 p.m.1 (R., Vol. 2, pp.944-945,
991 (Tr., p.61, L.2 - p.66, L.6; p.67, L.24 - p.68, L.1; p.243, Ls.14-18).)
Campbell, Gorley and Maylin stayed at the bar until it closed at 1:00 a.m., buying
rounds of drinks for each other, and drinking beer and other alcoholic drinks
during that time. (R., Vol. 2, pp.945-946 (Tr., p.67, L.20 - p.69, L.20).) Campbell
and Maylin were drunk. (R., Vol. 2, pp.946, 990, 991 (Tr., p.69, Ls.13-14; p.242,
L.21 - p.243, L.1).)
As Campbell, Gorley, and Maylin left the bar, Campbell saw an
acquaintance, Clayton Adams, standing under the bar patio, and Adams agreed

1

Stephen Maylin testified he and his roommate, James Nelson, arrived at the
Dutch Goose bar between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. (R., Vol. 2, p.990 (Tr., p.239, L.20
- p.240, L.9).)
1

to first drive Maylin to his home nearby, drive to Meridian to buy some beer, and
then take Campbell and Gorley with him to a party. (R., Vol. 2, pp.946, 947, 956,
957, 992, 1002, 1003 (Tr., p.69, L.23 - p.73, L.2; p.112, Ls.3-24; p.114, Ls.9-17;
p.248, Ls.2-4; p.290, L.12 - p.291, L.9 Ø).)2
The three friends -- Maylin, Gorley, and Campbell -- got into the back seat
of Adams’ compact 4-door car, with Campbell sitting behind the passenger’s
seat, Gorley in the middle, and Maylin behind the driver’s seat. (R., Vol. 2,
pp.847, 890 (Tr., p.76, L.18 - p.77, L.4; p.246, L.9 - p.247, L.9).) Adams’ friend,
Sergio Madrigal, who was not known by the others, sat in the front passenger’s
seat. (R., Vol. 2, p.1011 (Tr., p.324, Ls.1-3).)
Adams drove away from the Dutch Goose, and traveled down the NampaCaldwell Boulevard.

(R., Vol. 2, p.947 (Tr., p.73, Ls.10-17).)

According to

Campbell’s testimony,3 as Adams reached the intersection of the Boulevard and
Linden Road, he stopped the car a few seconds, and then, while the light was
still red, he bolted left onto Linden, despite not being in the left turn lane. (R.,
Vol. 2, p.948 (Tr., p.77, L.14 - p.78, L.10).) After turning onto Linden, Adams was
“flying through everything,” going 60 or 70 miles per hour. (R., Vol. 2, p.948 (Tr.,
p.78, L.22 - p.79, L.1).)

2

The Clerk’s Record, Volume 2, of the post-conviction case is missing a number
of pages from the jury trial transcript. Page 291 of the transcript of the jury trial is
missing and it, as well as any other missing portions from the post-conviction
Clerk’s Record, will be signaled by the symbol “Ø”.

3

Stephen Maylin testified that Adams did not run the stop-light at the Linden
intersection. (Tr., p.292, Ls.2-24 Ø.)
2

When Adams turned onto Linden, Adams told the three men in the back
seat that they had to give him $10 each for beer. (R., Vol. 2, pp.948, 992 (Tr.,
p.78, Ls.17-19; p.79, L.4 - p.80, L.3; p.249, Ls.4-16).) The three men yelled at
Adams that they did not have any money and “weren’t going to give him fucking
shit, nobody was going to get nothing.” (R., Vol. 2, pp.948, 992 (Tr., p.80, Ls.6-9;
p.249, Ls.20-21).) At that point, there was a lot of commotion in the car, with the
three young men in the back seat screaming for Adams to pull the car over so
they could walk, and Adams refusing to stop, threatening he “had a fucking knife
and a gun and that somebody was going to get hurt if they didn’t give up money.”
(R., Vol. 2, pp.948, 992 (Tr., p.80, Ls.18-21; p.249, L.23 - p.250, L.2).) As the
three men were screaming at Adams to stop the car, and as Adams screamed
for money, saying “he’s going to hurt people, stab people,” Adams slammed on
the car’s brakes and came to a stop in the middle of Linden Road, between
Middleton and Midland roads.4 (R., Vol. 2, pp.949, 992 (Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.83,
L.6; p.250, Ls.5-16).)
With the car stopped, the three men in the back seat were all screaming
“run,” and Maylin got out of the car from the left rear door, and Campbell and
Gorley, who Campbell could feel pushing behind him, got out of the car from the
right rear door. (R., Vol. 2, p.949 (Tr., p.83, L.13 - p.84, L.1).) When Maylin was
attempting to get out of the car from his back seat, Adams got out of car from the
driver’s door, opened Maylin’s rear door, and struck Maylin on his left side as he
was standing up to get out of the car. (R., Vol. 2, p.993 (Tr., p.253, L.16 - 254,
4

The front passenger, Sergio Madrigal, was not saying or doing anything during
this time. (R., Vol. 2, p.949 (Tr., p.82, Ls.8-12).)
3

L.8).) Maylin, not realizing he had been stabbed, doubled over, caught himself
on the car, and ran away from the scene and off the side of the road until he
noticed he was having trouble breathing. (R., Vol. 2, pp.993, 994, 998, 999 (Tr.,
p.254, L.9 - p.255, L.10; p.273, Ls.2-13; p.275, L.26 - p.276, L.7).) Maylin heard
Campbell yelling his name, and when he ran back to the scene, Campbell was
on a cell phone talking to 911 and Gorley was lying in the road. (R., Vol. 2, p.994
(Tr., p.255, L.13 - p.256, L.13).) Maylin did not see Adams and Gorley fighting.
(R., Vol. 2, pp.994, 1005 (Tr., p.257, L21-24; p.302, Ls.4-6).)
When Campbell got out of the car, he fled into a field, until he realized that
Gorley was not behind him anymore. (R., Vol. 2, pp.949, 950, 965 (Tr., p.83,
L.251 - p.84, L.1; p.86, Ls.8-24; p.141, L.6 - p.142, L.19).) Campbell turned
around and saw Adams and Gorley fighting a short distance from the back of
Adams’ car, with both men swinging at each other, Adams appearing to throw
body blows at Gorley, and Gorley appearing to be “fighting over the top” of
Adams. (R., Vol. 2, pp.950, 966 (Tr., p.87, L.10 - p.88, L.5; p.143, Ls.11-19).)
Campbell did not see any weapon. (R., Vol. 2, pp.950, 965-966 (Tr., p.88, Ls.910; p.142, L.25 - p.143, L.1).)
Campbell ran back towards Adams, and picked up some rocks on the way
and threw them at Adams. (R., Vol. 2, p.950 (Tr., p.88, Ls.11-21).) Adams
appeared to stumble, and then got into his car, turned off his car’s lights, and
drove away rapidly towards Meridian. (R., Vol. 2, p.951 (Tr., p.89, Ls.2-23).)
Campbell held Gorley up under his arm and told him they had to get out of there,
whereupon Gorley said “wait,” that he needed to catch his breath, then fell over,

4

pulling Campbell on top of him. (R., Vol. 2, p.951 (Tr., p.89, L.6 - p.90, L.11).)
Campbell could feel blood coming from Gorley’s chest, and after pulling Gorley’s
jacket back and seeing a lot of blood, he began screaming for Maylin to come
back so he could use Maylin’s cell phone to call 911 -- but then remembered
Gorley had a cell phone, and retrieved it from Gorley’s pants pocket and made
the 911 call himself. (R., Vol. 2, p.951 (Tr., p.90, L.14 - p.91, L.6).) The 911
operator asked Campbell to go to a nearby residence to see what the address
was, which Campbell did after Maylin came back to the scene to stay with
Gorley. (R., Vol. 2, p. 952 (Tr., p.94, L.8 - p.95, L.5).)
Minutes later, law enforcement officers arrived on the scene, followed by
paramedics. (R., Vol. 2, pp.952, 953 (Tr., p.96, L.14 - p.97, L.2).) According to
Canyon County Paramedic Jenifer Wyatt, who responded to the 911 call, Gorley
was transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center after Gorley’s heart
unexpectedly began to show a heartbeat. (R., Vol. 2, pp.1045, 1047, 1048 (Tr.,
p.466, Ls.9-16; p.474, L.6 - p.475, L.11).) Wyatt also testified that later that
morning she transported a second stabbing victim (Stephen Maylin, as identified
by Wyatt through State’s Exhibit 16) to a hospital, and noted he had what
appeared to be a stab wound about one inch wide that went in deep under his
left armpit, although he appeared to be stable. (R., Vol. 2, p.1048 (Tr., p.476, L.4
- p.477, L.10).) Stephen Maylin did not realize he had been stabbed until he
removed his coat much later that morning while being interviewed at the Canyon
County Sheriff’s Office; paramedics were summoned and he was transported to
the hospital. (R., Vol. 2, pp.995-996 (Tr., p.259, L.9 - 263, L.2).)

5

Sergio Madrigal testified that he was Adams’ friend, and he was with
Adams at the Dutch Goose on the evening of March 10, 2006. (R., Vol. 2,
pp.1008-1009 (Tr., p.311, Ls.6-17; p.314, L.7 - p.315, L.21).) Madrigal affirmed
that after closing time, he, Adams, and the three men (whom he did not know),
left in Adams’ car to go to Meridian to buy beer, then to go to a party. (R., Vol. 2,
pp.1009--1011 (Tr., p.316, L.18 - p.319, L.2; p.324, Ls.1-3).) Madrigal recalled
Adams asking the three men in the back seat for “like $3” to buy beer, but did not
hear the men’s response because the radio was too loud. (R., Vol. 2, pp.1010,
1011 (Tr., p.321, L.21 - p.323, L.17).) Adams got very mad, stopped the car by
screeching the tires, and told the three men in the back seat to “get the F out.”
(R., Vol. 2, p.1010 (Tr., p.322, Ls.6-14).) The three men got out of the car, but
Madrigal did not see what occurred outside, as he stayed in the vehicle. (R., Vol.
2, p.1011 (Tr., p.323, L.6 - p.324, L.13).)
After sitting in the car a few minutes. Madrigal opened the door and saw
Adams coming back to the car, saying “let’s go.” (R., Vol. 2, pp.1011, 1018 (Tr.,
p.325, Ls.7-24; p.351, Ls.2-5; p.352, Ls.3-8).) Adams got in the car and drove
away fast, appearing to be very mad, and told Madrigal pointedly that he thought
he was his friend. (R., Vol. 2, p.1011 (Tr., p.326, Ls.2-26).) As they drove away,
Adams told Madrigal, “I think I stabbed somebody,” and then (when Madrigal did
not believe him), “I think I did stab somebody.” (R., Vol. 2, p.1012 (Tr., p.327,
Ls.9-24).) Adams showed Madrigal his knife, and asked him if he saw any blood
on it. (R., Vol. 2, p.1012 (Tr., p.328, Ls.1-3).) Madrigal looked at the knife a little
bit, but did not see any blood. Adams appeared very worried, and repeated a
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couple of times, “you don’t see no blood?” (R., Vol. 2, p.1012 (Tr., p.328, L.24 p.329, L.3).) Adams told Madrigal not to tell “nobody” and to lie “to police or
whoever said something, not to say anything.” (R., Vol. 2, p.1013 (Tr., p.331,
L.24 - p.332, L.8).) Madrigal was afraid of Adams at that point because Adams
was real upset, saying “nobody fucks with me.” (R., Vol. 2, p.1013 (Tr., p.332,
Ls.15-19).) Madrigal attempted to calm Adams down, and the two drove to a
Meridian convenience store and bought beer and cigarettes. (R., Vol. 2, p.1013
(Tr., p.333, Ls.4-24).) They then drove around Caldwell unsuccessfully looking
for the party they had heard about. (R., Vol. 2, pp.1013, 1014 (Tr., p.334, L.23 p.335, L.23).) Adams finally drove Madrigal to his (Adams’) trailer house, and
when they pulled in, Adams was arrested and Madrigal was taken in for
questioning. (R., Vol. 2, p.1014 (Tr., p.336, Ls.1-25).)
When Adams was arrested at his trailer, Canyon County Sheriff’s
Sergeant Timothy Bowen found a knife in Adams’ right front pocket, “a fold-up
clasp type knife with a clip on it, and it was clipped on to his front pants pocket.”
(Tr., p.521, Ls.15-25 Ø.) A swab of that knife was tested for DNA analysis, and
at trial, Idaho State Police Forensic Services Lab forensic scientist Cynthia Hall
testified the DNA on the “knife blade swab matched Tyler Gorley.” (R., Vol. 2,
p.1093 (Tr., p.649, L.24 - p.650, L.1).)
The ER trauma surgeon at St. Alphonsus hospital that treated Tyler
Gorley was Dr. George Munayirji, M.D. (R., Vol. 2, pp.969, 970 (Tr., p.155, Ls.13; p.158, L.20 - p.159, L.5).) He testified Gorley appeared to be close to death
when he arrived at the ER, but after an ampule of epinephrine was given to him,
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a blood pressure was produced, which caused the surgeon to take Gorley into
the operating room to examine his injuries in surgery. (R., Vol. 2, pp.970, 971
(Tr., p.162, L.2 - p.163, L.9).) Dr. Munayirji determined during the surgery that it
was not offering any help for Gorley, and Gorley was given a CT scan to assist in
determining the extent of his injuries, which showed there was blood around
Gorley’s heart, and that he had already suffered brain damage. (R., Vol. 2, p.971
(Tr., p.164, L.5 - p.165, L.5).) According to the surgeon, he detected four stab
wounds, the two most serious of which (1) penetrated the liver and (2)
“penetrated his pericardium, the sac that encloses the heart, and caused the
bleeding, and the blood was posing pressure on the heart.” (R., Vol. 2, p.971
(Tr., p.164, Ls.3-4; p.165, Ls.10-16).) According to Dr. Munayirji, the stab wound
to the heart required a “good amount of force,” and caused Gorley’s life to expire
at the ER. (R., Vol. 2, pp.971, 972 (Tr., p.166, Ls.2-8; p.168, Ls.9-24).)
Dr. Glen Groben, the forensic pathologist who conducted the autopsy on
Tyler Gorley’s body, determined there were five stab wounds on Gorley’s body,
one on the back of the upper left leg (that would have been easily missed by the
ER physicians), three wounds to the side of his chest (one of which cut through
Gorley’s liver), and one wound toward the center of his chest. 5 (R., Vol. 2, p.978
(Tr., p.191, L.1 - p.192, L.2; p.194, L.11 - 201, L.8).) Dr. Groben confirmed it was
the stab wound to Gorley’s chest, which cut between his ribs and into the right

5

Two of the stab wounds to Gorley’s side, and the wound to the back of his left
leg, although more than superficial in nature, were not potentially fatal. (R., Vol.
2, pp.982, 983 (Tr., p.209, L.4 - p.210, L.25; p.211, Ls.3-24).)
8

ventricle of Gorley’s heart, that caused his death. (R., Vol. 2, pp.981-984 (Tr.,
p.206, Ls.4-16; p.208, L.4 - p.209, L.3; p.214, Ls.16-23; p.215, L.8 - p.216, L.10.)
The state charged Adams with first degree murder (or in the alternative
felony murder), aggravated battery, and three counts of attempted robbery. (R.,
Vol. 3, pp.1677-1681.) A jury convicted him after a trial of second degree murder
and aggravated battery. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 216 P.3d 146 (Ct. App.
2009). The district court imposed a life sentence with twenty-five years fixed for
Adams’ second degree murder conviction, and a consecutive ten years with
three years fixed for aggravated battery.

(Id.)

The Idaho Court of Appeals

affirmed Adams’ convictions and sentences. (Id.)
In 2010, Adams filed a lengthy pro se post-conviction petition (R., Vol. 1,
p.12 et seq), and in 2012 (through appointed counsel), he filed an Amended
Petition (R., Vol. 3, pp.1641-1675).

On January 18, 2013, the state filed a

Memorandum for Trial and Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., Vol. 3, pp.17301735.) At a hearing on the state’s motion for summary dismissal held on June
23, 2014, the court dismissed all but two of Adams’ post-conviction claims and
ordered he be re-sentenced on his second degree murder conviction as a result
of his prevailing on the two sentence-related claims.6 (R., Vol. 3, pp.1855-1861;
see generally 6/23/14 Tr.) Adams fax-filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. (R., Vol. 3, pp.1904-1907, 1922-1935.)

6

On re-sentencing, the court again sentenced Adams to a unified life term with
25 years fixed for second degree murder, which sentence was affirmed on
appeal. State v. Adams, Docket No. 42667, 2015 Unpub. Op. No. 588 (Idaho
App. Aug. 11, 2015).
9

Adams filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 3, pp.1936-1939.) This
case was remanded briefly to the district court to determine whether the court, in
denying Adams’ motion for reconsideration, had considered the affidavit of a
DNA expert, Dr. Hampikian, which lacked a notarized signature page. (12/7/15
Mot. for Temp. Remand; 1/7/16 Order Granting Motion for Temp. Remand.) The
district court entered findings that, although the notarized signature page had not
been received through the fax-filing, “the court considered the information
contained in his affidavit as if it had been notarized[,]” and “would have reached
the same conclusions had Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit had [sic] been received and
filed in proper form.” (2/11/16 Findings upon Remand from Supreme Court.)

10

ISSUES
Adams’ statement of the issues on appeal is lengthy and needs not be
repeated here, but can be found at pages 7-8 of the Appellant’s Brief. The state
rephrases the issues as:
Has Adams failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s summary
dismissal of his claims because he failed to present a genuine issue of material
fact? Additionally, has Adams failed to that the district court abused its discretion
in denying his request for investigative funds?

11

ARGUMENT
Adams Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
His Post-Conviction Claims; Additionally, Adams Has Failed To Show The Court
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Request For Investigative Funds
A.

Introduction
Adams contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing five

claims presented in his post-conviction petition.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.8-40.)

However, a review of the record and of the applicable law supports the district
court’s determination that Adams failed to present an issue of material fact
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any of the five post-conviction claims he
presents on appeal.

Adams has also failed to show the court abused its

discretion in denying his request for investigative funds.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court’s

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

12

C.

General Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than “a short and plain statement of the claim” that would suffice for a
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (referencing I.R.C.P. 8).
The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. Id. (citing I.C. § 194903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own
initiative.

“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must

present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises
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no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of petitioner’s claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.
While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the
court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho
797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not
entitle the petitioner to relief, the district court is not required to conduct an
evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition. Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).

“Allegations contained in the

application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a
matter of law.” Id.
D.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
In State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 417-418, 348 P.3d 1, 32-33 (2015),

the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the following standards applicable to
ineffective assistance of counsel claims:
This Court utilizes the Strickland two-prong test to determine
whether a defendant in a criminal case received effective
assistance of counsel. [Citations omitted.] To establish deficient
performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 . . . . To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694 . . . . A reasonable
14

probability is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result
must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 112 . . . (2011).
The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption
“that counsel ‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, . . . 131
S.Ct. 1388, 1407 . . . (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 . .
. ). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and
to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . . . . Thus, strategic decisions are
“virtually unchallengeable” if made after a “thorough investigation of
law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Id. at 690 . . . .
Decisions “made after less than complete investigation” are still
reasonable to the extent “reasonable professional judgments
support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 691 . . . . Counsel is
permitted to develop a strategy Richter, 562 U.S. at 107 . . . .
E.

Adams Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
1(a). Failure To Call Crissy Powell And Lynette Skeen As Witnesses
The district court summarily dismissed Adams’ claim that his trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen
as witnesses at trial.

(6/23/14 Tr., p.62, L.15 – p. 65, L.12.)

The court

concluded: (1) trial counsel’s decision was strategic and tactical, (2) Adams failed
to show that either witness would have been available to testify at trial, (3)
Adams failed to show that the two women would have testified consistently with
their prior statements, and (4) even if they had testified in accordance with their
earlier statements, the outcome of the trial would not have been different. (Id.)
Adams was required to overcome a strong presumption “that counsel
‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
15

judgment.’” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). Adams also
had the burden of presenting admissible evidence that, based upon counsel’s
perspective at the time, he failed to call the two women as witnesses because of
an objective shortcoming, such as inadequate preparation or investigation. 7 Id.
at 689. Based on the information known by Adams’ counsel prior to trial – not by
20–20 hindsight or by what further investigation “might” discover – he exercised
competent professional judgment in making the tactical decision that further
investigating Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen and calling them to testify at trial
was not warranted.

Crissy Powell’s statements show she could not present

relevant and admissible testimony at trial. Lynette Skeen’s statements provided
no benefit to the defense.
First, Crissy Powell’s alleged statement to Ashley Adams that “she was at
the bar and Tyler was just rude and a jerk and he was looking for a fight all night
and called her the town whore” (R., Vol. 1, p.376), was not evidence of Tyler’s
“then existing state of mind” under I.R.E. 803(3)8 because it was not a statement
made by Tyler Gorley about his own state of mind. (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-

7

Adams’ request that this Court apply the less deferential “inadequate
preparation” (or “investigation”) standard for reviewing trial counsel’s decision to
not call the two women to testify at trial is unfounded. See Abdullah, 158 Idaho
at 418, 348 P.3d at 33 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“Decisions ‘made
after less than complete investigation’ are still reasonable to the extent
‘reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’”)
8

I.R.E. 803(3) excepts from the hearsay rule “[a] statement of the declarant’s
then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant’s will.”
16

16 (arguing that the statement was “state of mind” evidence).) Rather, it was a
conclusory statement allegedly made by Powell about what she thought Gorley’s
state of mind may have been. Moreover, Powell’s alleged comments to Ashley
Adams were not relevant because they did not threaten any violence or harm
against Adams; therefore, even if Powell would have testified as Ashley Adams
suggested, her testimony would not have been admissible under I.R.E. 402 and
403.
Crissy Powell’s alleged comments (clearly hearsay in need of an
exception) did not show that Tyler Gorley had a “pertinent trait” for violence under
I.R.E. 404(a)(2), which would have been admissible in the form of opinion or
reputation testimony under 405(a).9

(See Appellant’s Brief, p.15.)

Even

assuming, arguendo, that Powell would have testified at trial consistently with the
9

I.R.E. 404(a)(2) states:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on the
particular occasion, except:
....
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide
case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
I.R.E. 405(a) states in relevant part:
Rule 405. Methods of proving character.
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of
character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may
be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form
of an opinion.
17

statements attributed to her by Ashley Adams,10 such testimony would not have
been admissible as opinion or reputation evidence because there was no
indication Powell knew Gorley sufficiently to have formed an opinion about his
allegedly violent character, or knew he had a reputation in the community for
violence.
Next, Lynette Skeen’s witness statement explained that when she woke
up from her sleep after hearing male voices yelling, she looked out her bedroom
window and “saw car headlights and heard someone yell, ‘Get the Fuck back
here.’”

(R., Vol. 1, p.393.)

Adams claims Gorley was the person who was

yelling.

However, as shown above, the state’s evidence was that Campbell,

Maylin and Gorley fled from a knife wielding Adams who remained in the
proximity of his own car, in which he shortly thereafter sped away with his friend,
Sergio Madrigal. Based on the facts of the case, the assertion that Gorley was
the person who yelled, “Get the Fuck back here” runs counter to common sense
and logic. Adams failed to present any reason for trial counsel to believe that, if
located, Lynette Skeen could have said anything more than what was already in
her written statement, much less that she would have identified Gorley and not
Adams as the man who yelled “Get the Fuck back here.”
There is no basis for concluding that Adams’ trial counsel should have
concluded that Crissy Powell or Lynette Skeen could have added any information
to their statements, which were respectively inadmissible and unhelpful to the

10

The district court explained, “Mr. Adams has failed to show that Powell would
have testified consistently with what his sister has stated nor that she was even
available to testify.” (6/23/14 Tr., p.63, Ls.15-18.)
18

defense, that would have supported Adams’ defense. Even if relying on the
statements made counsel’s investigation “less than complete,” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691, based on the information known by Adams’ counsel prior to trial, he
exercised “reasonable professional judgment” in deciding tactically to not
fruitlessly spend time and money investigating Powell and Skeen and calling
them to testify at trial.

The district court therefore correctly concluded that

Adams’ trial counsel’s decision to not call Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen as
witnesses, or conduct further investigation before making that decision, was a
rational tactical and strategic decision.11
In sum, Adams’ trial counsel had no reason to believe either Crissy Powell
or Lynette Skeen could provide either admissible evidence or evidence that
would support Adams’ defense of self-defense.

The fact that Adams’ trial

counsel could not recall the names of the two women when he was deposed in
2011 does not mean that counsel did not make a reasonable strategic decision –
based on what information he had at the time – to not investigate them further or
call them as witnesses at trial. Adams has failed to demonstrate any error in the
district court’s determination that Adams failed to rebut the presumption that his
trial counsel’s decision was tactical or strategic; therefore, he has failed to show
that counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland. See Abdullah, 158
11

Adams does not explain where the record shows that his trial counsel did not
contact the two women prior to trial. Instead, he speculates that if the two
women had been contacted in the post-conviction proceeding (presumably by a
court authorized investigator), they “could have also shown that defense counsel
never contacted either witness which would tend to show there was no strategic
decision not to call them as witnesses.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.19.) Adams’
assertion that his trial counsel failed to contact Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen
prior to trial is merely conclusory and not based on any concrete evidence.
19

Idaho at 418, 348 P.3d at 33 (there is a strong presumption counsel exercised
reasonable professional judgment).
Moreover, Adams has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s
decision to not call Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen as witnesses resulted in any
prejudice, the second requirement of Strickland.

Based on the reasoning

expressed above (i.e., lack of relevance and/or admissibility) and the testimony
and evidence presented at trial as set forth in the Statement of Facts and Course
of Proceedings, supra, relied upon here, and the scant (if any) impact the two
women’s statements would have had in supporting Adams’ defense, this Court
should conclude that there is no “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s
alleged error, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Adams has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s summary
dismissal of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen and have them testify at trial.
1(b). Denial Of Request For Investigative Funds
Adams has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his request for funds to hire an investigator to locate Crissy Powell and
Lynette Skeen prior to granting the state’s summary dismissal motion. A review
of the record reveals the district court acted well within its discretion by denying
Adams’ motion for funds for investigative services.
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter left to the
sound discretion of the district court. I.C.R. 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135
20

Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) (citing Fairchild v. State, 128 Idaho 311,
319, 912 P.2d 679, 687 (Ct. App. 1996)). On review, the appellate court must
determine whether the district court “acted within the boundaries of its discretion,
consistent with any legal standards applicable to its specific choices, and
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”

State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994). “In order to
be granted discovery, a post-conviction applicant must identify the specific
subject matter where discovery is requested and why discovery as to those
matters is necessary to his or her application.” State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803,
810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003), (citing Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402403, 973 P.2d at 754-755).
“Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant’s substantial rights,
the district court is not required to order discovery.” Raudebaugh, 135 Idaho at
605, 21 P.3d at 927. Moreover, discovery is not a mechanism for finding out if
evidence supports claims, and this “fishing expedition” discovery is discouraged.
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148, 139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006)
(“‘Fishing expedition’ discovery should not be allowed. The UPCPA provides a
forum for known grievances, not an opportunity to research for grievances.”).
Thirteen days before the hearing on the state’s motion for summary
dismissal, Adams filed an “Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Costs and Notice of
Hearing.” (R., Vol. 3, pp.1812-1816.) Adams’ motion requested the court to
authorize funds for an investigator to locate Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen,
and stated that Adams’ trial counsel testified during a 2011 deposition that he
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“did not recall if he questioned Crissy Powell” and did not remember who Ms.
Skeen was. (R., Vol. 3, pp.1814-1815; see generally 9/21/15 Aug., 8/22/11 Tr.12)
Adams’ motion for investigative funds did not state what efforts Adams’ counsel
made to locate the two women. However, during the October 26, 2015 hearing
on Adams’ motion for investigative funds, his counsel explained:
And Judge, just so you’re aware, in what limited resources I
have, I have not been able to find these witnesses. So it wasn’t –
we didn’t come to the Court first for costs. We first – I first tried to
do what I could to find them, but was unable to.
(6/10/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-19.)
The district court denied Adams’ request for investigative funds based on
its untimeliness and Adams’ counsel’s inability to explain why it was filed so late.
(6/10/14 Tr., p.10, L.22 – p.11, L.19.) The court voiced concern about the fact
that the motion for funds came so close to the imminent hearing date on the
state’s motion for summary dismissal. The court explained, “And here we are on
the eve of the State noticing up their motion. And I get this responding matter
that an investigator’s needed to locate the witnesses.”13 (6/10/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.811.)

The court noted the motion came long after Adams’ trial counsel’s

deposition (in 2011), and two years after Adams filed his amended postconviction petition containing the claims relating to Crissy Powell and Lynette
12

On September 21, 2015, this Court entered an Order Granting Motion to
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule, augmenting the appellate record
with, inter alia, the deposition of Judge Dayo Onanubosi (Adams’ former trial
counsel). References to the transcripts included in that Order will be prefaced by
“9/21/15 Aug.”, followed by the date of the proceeding, page number (as per
transcript quadrant page numbers), and line numbers.
13

At the end of the pre-trial conference/motion hearing, the court set the hearing
on the state’s motion for summary dismissal for June 23, 2014, 13 days later.
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Skeen. (6/10/14 Tr., p.10, L.24 – p.11, L.9.) Based on the timing of Adams’
motion for investigative funds, the court was well within its discretion to find that
Adams’ motion was untimely.
The district court also concluded that Adams’ post-conviction counsel
failed to provide a valid reason for the lengthy delay by her statements that she
had “limited resources,” that she had “not been able to find these witnesses,” and
she had “first tried to do what [she] could to find them, but was unable to.”
(6/10/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-19.) Adams’ counsel failed to explain (1) what efforts
she made to contact the two women, (2) why she could not locate the two
women because her resources were limited, and (3) why an investigator could be
expected to locate the two women within days of the hearing on the state’s
motion for summary dismissal when counsel was unable to do so over a much
longer period. Based on the lateness of the motion and Adams’ counsel’s lack of
specificity for why she had not been able to locate the two women, the court
properly, and within its discretion, concluded there was no showing of good
cause for the delay and denied the motion. (6/10/14 Tr., p.10, L.22 – p.11, L.19.)
Further, none of Adams’ substantial rights were impacted by the district
court’s denial of is request for investigative funds. For the same reasons Adams’
claim that his trial counsel’s performance failed to meet the prejudice prong
under Strickland – that Lynette Skeen and Crissy Powell’s statements were
irrelevant and/or inadmissible – the district court’s order did not prejudice Adams’
substantial rights. As discussed, hoping that Skeen would be able to identify the
person who said “Get the Fuck back here” is pure speculation, and Powell’s
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statements would have been inadmissible and irrelevant at trial and there was no
indication that she had anything to add to them.
Perhaps most significant is the fact that, based on what he knew prior to
trial, Adams’ trial counsel had no Sixth Amendment obligation to investigate
Crissy Powell and Lynette Skeen or call them as witnesses at trial. Therefore, it
would have been utterly pointless for Adams’ post-conviction counsel to hire an
investigator with public funds in order to go on a “fishing expedition” to find out
what trial counsel “might” have learned. Inasmuch as Adams’ trial counsel had
no Sixth Amendment duty to investigate the two women or call them at trial,
whatever the post-conviction investigation found would have been irrelevant to
Adams’ claim and the germane question of what information trial counsel had at
the time. Not only would such investigation constitute a fishing expedition, but
there would be no possibility of fish in the lake.

Because none of Adams’

substantial rights were affected by the denial of his request for investigative
funds, the district court’s order should be affirmed.
2.

Failure To Seek DNA Analysis Of Tyler Gorley’s Clothing

The district court granted Adams’ request “that DNA testing be performed
on the presumed knife wound entrance holes in Tyler Gorley’s clothing” (R., Vol.
3, p.1775), to determine if there had been any transfer of Stephen Maylin’s DNA
onto Gorley’s clothing. After testing, Forensic Scientist Cyndi Hall concluded that
Gorley was the source of DNA on all four swabs submitted to her: two swabs
from his t-shirt and two swabs from his red jacket. (12/18/13 Forensic Biology
Report.) At a hearing on June 23, 2014, the court summarily dismissed all but
24

two of Adams’ post-conviction claims and ordered he be re-sentenced on his
second degree murder conviction as a result of his prevailing on the two
sentence-related claims. (R., Vol. 3, pp.1855-1861; see generally 6/23/14 Tr.) In
dismissing Adams’ claim, the court explained, “I don’t see how any – the DNA
report that we have, that there was not a genetic transfer would have made any
difference in the outcome of the trial.” (6/23/14 Tr., p.65, Ls.7-10.)
Adams fax-filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the summarily
dismissed claims, with an attached affidavit by Dr. Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. –
however, the last page containing the sworn oath was not received by the court.
(R., Vol. 3, pp.1904-1907.) The court entered an order and judgment denying
the motion in its entirety, but did not specifically mention the affidavit of Dr.
Hampikian (R., Vol. 3, pp.1922-1935). On appeal, Adams’ appellate counsel was
granted a motion to remand to determine whether the district court had actually
considered Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit despite the fact that it lacked the sworn
signature page. (12/7/15 Mot. for Temp. Remand; 1/7/16 Order Granting Motion
for Temp. Remand.) On remand, the district court entered findings that, although
the notarized signature page was not received by the Clerk’s office, “the court
considered the information contained in his affidavit as if it had been notarized[,]”
and “would have reached the same conclusions had Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit
had [sic] been received and filed in proper form.”

(2/11/16 Findings upon

Remand from Supreme Court.)
Adams’ claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek DNA
testing to see if Stephen Maylin’s DNA transferred to Tyler Gorley’s clothing is
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predicated on the notion that the absence of such transfer would show that
Adams did not stab Maylin.14 The district court correctly summarily dismissed
Adams’ claim because he failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.
Moreover, the district court’s summary dismissal of this claim should be upheld
because Adams has failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance was
deficient under Strickland. See State v. White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d
318, 319 (1982); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 901 (2001).
Although the district court granted Adams’ motion for DNA testing of Tyler
Gorley’s clothing, the results of such testing – either way – could not have been
exculpatory. If Stephen Maylin’s DNA would have been on Gorley’s clothing, it
would have certainly supported Maylin’s testimony that he was stabbed first.
However, the inverse does not hold true. The absence of Maylin’s DNA on the
four areas of Gorley’s clothing that were swabbed does not show Maylin was not
stabbed first, or, as Adams even further suggests, that Maylin was not stabbed
by a knife at all. (See Appellant’s Brief, p.27 (“The absence of his DNA indicates
that Mr. Maylin had not been stabbed when he first left the car and that he may
not have been stabbed by a knife at all. . . . Besides Mr. Maylin’s testimony
there was no other evidence presented that he was even stabbed by a knife.”)
Adams’ argument fails on several fronts.
Contrary to Adams’ argument, the negative results of testing for Stephen
Maylin’s DNA on Tyler Gorley’s t-shirt and jacket do not tend to prove Adams did

14

It should be noted that Forensic Scientist Cynthia Hall also testified at trial that
Adams’ knife had another, but unknown, person’s DNA on it, besides Tyler
Gorley’s. (R., Vol. 2, Tr., p.649, L.25 – p.650, L.11.)
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not stab Maylin. Significantly, Dr. Glen Groben, the forensic pathologist who
conducted the autopsy on Tyler Gorley’s body, testified at trial that Tyler suffered
five stab wounds, one on the back of the upper left leg, three wounds to the side
of his chest, and one wound toward the center of his chest. (Trial Tr., p.191, L.1
- p.192, L.2; p.194, L.11 - 201, L.8.) As argued by the prosecutor in his objection
to Adams’ motion for reconsideration:
Somehow the concept that there was no DNA evidence from one
victim on the clothing of the deceased victim suggests that
Petitioner is innocent, is an unsupported conclusory statement.
There are many possibilities of why there was not [sic] DNA
evidence found. One is the testing site selection. Another may be
the tissue and clothing of Mr. Mayhlin [sic] may have wiped away
DNA evidence off the knife before it was repeatedly used on Tyler
Gorley. Perhaps Petitioner wiped the blade clean before he
stabbed the deceased. . . .
Again, there is nothing in the Motion for Reconsideration that
comes close to being admissible evidence. Petitioner has failed to
provide any evidence that would indicate that Petitioner did not stab
Tyler Gorley as related to DNA evidence.
He has merely
suggested that because there was no DNA of Steven Maylin on the
entry wound sites on Tyler Gorley’s clothing, that he did not stab
Tyler Gorley.[15]
(R., Vol. 3, p.1914.)
As the prosecutor explained, there are several possible reasons for not
finding Stephen Maylin’s DNA on Tyler Gorley’s t-shirt and jacket. The “testing
site selection” may not have been where Maylin’s DNA was located. Adams did
not present any evidence to explain whether the four sites (two on the t-shirt, two
on the jacket) analyzed four separate stab wounds, or, alternatively, if the two t15

The highlighted references to Tyler Gorley were obvious misstatements.
Adams argues that the absence of transfer DNA (Stephen Maylin to Tyler Gorley)
showed that he did not stab Stephen Maylin.
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shirt holes and two jacket holes aligned with each other to reflect only two stab
wounds, each one penetrating Gorley’s t-shirt and jacket. If so, the DNA analysis
of Gorley’s clothing related only to two of the five stab wounds inflicted, and
Maylin’s DNA may have been wiped off during any of the other three stabbings of
Gorley – none of which were tested. It is also possible that Adams wiped the
knife blade himself after he stabbed Maylin, as it appeared to Sergio Madrigal
that Adams was worried about whether blood was on his knife when he returned
to his car. (R., Vol. 2, p.1012 (Tr., p.328, L.1 – p.329, L.3).) It is also possible
that Maylin’s DNA was wiped off the knife when Adams extracted it from Maylin’s
body and back through Maylin’s own clothing and jacket. Inasmuch as DNA
testing for transfer evidence could not have helped (and only possibly harmed)
Adams’ case, Adams’ trial counsel cannot have been deficient in failing to pursue
such evidence, nor could his conduct have prejudiced Adams’ case.
Further, Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit does nothing to help Adams’ contention
that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.16 The first relevant part of
Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit states the obvious:
8.

I would expect to find DNA on an object or weapon after it
punctured a person and caused extensive bleeding.”

9.

Assuming that the knife or object that caused a puncture
wound had not been cleaned in any way, it is extremely
unlikely that DNA would not be found on that object or
weapon.

16

Although Dr. Hampikian’s affidavit states that he is a DNA expert, it does not
state that he had any training or other expertise in the transfer of DNA. (See R.,
Vol. 3, p.1906-1907.)
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(R., Vol. 3, p.1906 (emphasis added).) The above scenario is based on the
undisputed idea that an object causing a puncture wound and extensive bleeding
would be “extremely unlikely” to not have DNA on it – unless it was cleaned.
There, however, is no mention of multiple persons being stabbed, or that the
stabs were through clothing. Dr. Hampikian’s subsequent hypothetical comes a
bit closer to the facts of this case; it states:
10.

Hypothetically, if someone were to stab one person (person
A) with an instrument and then stab a second person with
that same instrument (person B), I would expect to find a
mixture of person A and person B’s DNA on the instrument.
If person B was stabbed through his or her clothing, I would
also expect to find person A’s DNA transferred to person B’s
clothing.

(R., Vol. 3, p.1907.) Dr. Hampikian’s hypothetical, while closer to the facts in this
case in regard to the clothing worn by Tyler Gorley (“person B”), does not
account for the fact that Stephen Maylin (“person A”) was wearing a shirt and
jacket that, to some extent, had to have a “wiping” effect on Adams’ knife when
he pulled it out of Maylin’s body. (See R., Vol. 2, p.995 (Tr., p.259, L.19 – p.262,
L.6).) Even though he did not account for the possibility that Stephen Maylin’s
shirt and jacket may have been a “way” Adams’ knife was “cleaned” (see R., Vol.
3, p.1906, ¶ 8), Dr. Hampikian only opined that he “would expect” a DNA transfer
– hardly the type of opinion that would have affected the outcome of the trial
against Adams for committing aggravated battery against Maylin.17

17

Dr.

During trial, Forensic Scientist Cynthia Hall was questioned about whether
Stephen Maylin’s blood would be expected to be found on areas around the knife
holes in Tyler Gorley’s clothing, and she repeatedly said it was “possible,” but it
depended on other factors such as the amount of blood and whether it was
cleaned or washed, finally explaining, “It’s possible for blood to transfer and it’s
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Hampikian’s affidavit fails to show that Adams’ trial counsel’s performance was
either deficient or prejudicial.
Lastly, the testimony and evidence presented at trial showing Adams
committed aggravated battery against Stephen Maylin was overwhelming. The
testimony and evidence set forth in the Statement of Facts and Course of
Proceedings, supra, and relied upon here in part, clearly shows Adams’ guilt.
Conversely, as discussed, the absence of “transfer” DNA on the knife does not
show that Maylin was not stabbed by Adams, and would have little, if any, impact
on the trial. The following additional points support the district court’s summary
dismissal of this claim on the ground that Adams failed to show prejudice.
Adams’ contention that the evidence and testimony presented at trial did
not show that he stabbed Stephen Maylin and, further, that Maylin was not even
stabbed, is belied by the record. Maylin testified that he was stabbed by Adams
and the physical evidence of his wound clearly supported his testimony. (See St.
Exs. 14, 16), As discussed, Paramedic Jenifer Wyatt’s explained that, based on
her six years of experience as an EMS and EMT in Utah, stab wounds leave
clean-edged (not jagged) cuts without bruising around the cut (R., Vol. 2, p.10451047 (Tr., p.466, L.14 – p.467, L.15; p.472, Ls.7-25)), and described Maylin’s
wound has “a one-inch in width laceration type puncture wound” that was “in
deep through the tissue to where you could see like the muscle and the fatty
tissue underneath, so it appeared to [her] to be a deep – a deep puncture” (R.,
Vol.2, p.1050 (Tr., p.483, Ls.18-23)). Wyatt concluded that Stephen Maylin’s
also possible to not see blood, depending on the circumstances and the amount
of blood present. (R., Vol. 2, pp.1094-1095 (Tr., p.653, L.18 – p. 656, L.4.)
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wound was “consistent” with “what [she has] seen of stab wounds in the past[,]”
and she believed Maylin had a stab wound. (R., Vol. 2, P.1050 (Tr., p.483, L.11
– p.485, L.21).) Adams’ admission that he was swinging his knife toward both
Maylin and Gorley (albeit in an alleged attempt to defend himself), also adds to
the certainty that he stabbed Maylin. (R., Vol. 2, p.1127-1128 (Tr., p.786, L.4 –
p.790, L.13).) There was no testimony at trial that any other person held a knife
during the incident, or that Maylin was “punctured” by any other object.
Considering the total inability of the DNA test results (or lack of DNA
transfer) to show that Adams did not stab Stephen Maylin, and the overwhelming
evidence presented at trial showing he did, the district court correctly summarily
dismissed Adams’ claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek
such DNA testing.

Because Adams has failed to demonstrate that his trial

counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland, the
district court’s summary dismissal of this claim should be affirmed.
3.

Concession Of Voluntary Manslaughter During Closing Argument

During closing argument at trial, Adam’s counsel stated that the incident
involved “a sudden quarrel that rises from the heat of passion” (R., Vol. 2, p.1164
(Tr., p.947, L.23 – p.948, L.14), and made several other similar statements
reflecting some of the instructional language of the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter. (See R., Vol. 2, p.1154 (Tr., p.909, L.21 – p.911, L.4)
(Instr. Nos. 19, 20)); p.1166 (Tr., p.955, L.25 – p.56, L.2); p.1168 (Tr., p.963,
Ls.4-6); pp.1168-1169 (Tr., p.966, L.12 – p.967, L.18).) Adams claimed in his
post-conviction petition that his trial counsel’s comments constituted a
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concession that Adams was guilty of manslaughter and, as a result, counsel
failed to pursue a self-defense theory. (R., Vol. 3, pp.1667-1668.)
The district court rejected Adams’ claim, stating in relevant part:
I think it’s essential to note that Mr. Onanubosi never
instructed the jurors to return a verdict of manslaughter, nor did
they. And, again, I think his – it’s important to clue on what he did
say to the jury. He maintained it was a fight. He maintained it was
a quarrel. He maintained it was self-defense as he stated in his
deposition. Unfortunately, the jurors didn’t agree.
From the record that I reviewed, the statements of counsel
were strategically designed to minimize the charges against his
client. His client was charged with first degree murder, and I think
the findings of the jury evidence the facts [sic] that further because
Mr. Adams was found not guilty of the robbery, was not convicted
of first degree murder. So summary dismissal is appropriate.
(6/23/14 Tr., p.78, L.25 – p.79, L.17.)
On appeal, Adams contends the district court erred in summarily
dismissing his claim, alleging that his trial counsel conceded he was guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, and that counsel mentioned, but never argued, selfdefense “nor [did] he ask the jury to acquit on the murder or battery charge on
that basis.”

(Appellant’s Brief, p.29.)

Adams further argues that such

“concession of guilt” without his consent so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process as to trigger a presumption of prejudice entitling him to a
new trial. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.31-39 (citing, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984)). Review of the record shows Adams’ argument fails.
First, Adams has failed to identify from the record any actual concession
by counsel to the voluntary manslaughter charge. Adams merely points out that
his trial counsel told the jury several times that the incident involved “a sudden
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quarrel” that rises to the level of “heat of passion.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.28-29.)
However, at no point during his opening statement or closing argument did
Adams’ counsel concede that the state had proven all of the elements of
voluntary manslaughter, nor did he ask the jury to return a verdict finding Adams
guilty of that charge. As the district court noted, the fact that the jury did not
convict Adams of voluntary manslaughter is an indication that the jury was not
invited to do so by such an alleged concession.18 (See 6/23/14 Tr., p.78, L.25 p.79, L.4.) Because Adams has failed to identify from the record any concession
of guilt to the voluntary manslaughter charge, his claim that such “concession”
was presumptively prejudicial necessarily fails.
Next, the self-defense theory of Adams’ defense was evident throughout
trial. During opening statements, Adams’ counsel told the jury:
Now, in the process of this trial, you will hear testimony as to
Mr. Gorley, how big he is, how tall he is. Mr. Campbell will also tell
you when he looked back, he can see them actual [sic] fighting –
actually fighting, throwing blows at each other. At some point they
went down on the ground rolling around. There was a point in time
[Adams] was pinned down. He knew there were two other people
in the surrounding area, and all this was going on, we’re talking
about seconds, minutes.
At that point, the testimony will be he feared for his life. He
didn’t know what was going on. He perceived a danger. Instantly
he remembered he had a knife clipped to his belt. He pulled it out,
opened it, and he was still swinging. He was still swinging while
they were still on the floor fighting still.
18

Even if trial counsel had conceded that Adams was guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, considering the obvious strength of the state’s case on the second
degree murder charge, such a concession would have been within the “exercise
of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See State v.
Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 509 n.51, 348 P.3d at 124 n.51 (recognizing “that such
concessions (or partial concessions) of guilt in opening statement or closing
argument have been upheld by federal appellate courts.”).
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(R., Vol. 2, p.941 (Tr., p.50, L.20 – p.51, L.10) (emphasis added).)
As promised by his trial counsel, Adams testified at length during trial
about how he was allegedly forced to defend himself from attack by Stephen
Maylin and Tyler Gorley, and at some point he realized he was “in deep shit” and
“needed to defend [him]self.” (R., Vol. 2, pp.1126-1127 (Tr., p.782, L.21 – p.783,
L.6; p.786, Ls.15-24); see generally id., pp.1111-1149.) At the outset of Adam’s
closing argument, his trial counsel told the jury:
This is a case – you guys already figured this out the first
day or the second day what this case is all about. I told you during
my opening argument what this case is all about, and I want you to
hold me to it.
(R., Vol. 2, p.1164 (Tr., p.947, Ls.16-20).)
Although trial counsel’s terminology during closing argument reflected
some of the language relating to voluntary manslaughter, it accurately described
the incident. The fact that the incident involved a “sudden quarrel” that rose to
the level of “heat of passion” is not inconsistent with self-defense. The murder
charge was of foremost importance for trial counsel to defend against, and
counsel skillfully attempted to do so by arguing that the “sudden quarrel” and
“heat of passion” nature of the incident precluded the jury from convicting Adams
of murder – while simultaneously maintaining Adams’ self-defense theory. The
following part of Adams’ trial counsel’s closing argument demonstrates counsel’s
dual strategy:
This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rises to the heat of
passion among a group of drunk people that night that turned
deadly.
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Now, if there is no robbery, there’s no attempted robbery,
felony murder disappear [sic]. Then what do we have left? First
degree murder.
There’s no premeditation here.
Read the
instruction of premeditation.
Read the instruction of malice
aforethought. We don’t have that. And he’ll take responsibility for
what he did, but no more and no less.
Then what do we have after that? We have aggravated
battery. Mr. Maylin I already put over here telling us how he got –
you know, we talk a lot about self-defense, and the instructions say,
you know, hindsight is good. . . .
....
Read the instructions. You’ll have them.
You know, I told you talking about self-defense, you know,
hindsight is good, 20-20 is good. It describes what happened,
where he was. I wasn’t there. They were not there. But one thing
we know for sure is there was testimony about two people swinging
at each other. . . .
....
Hindsight is good. 20-20 is good. I wasn’t there, you were
not there, and he told you how he felt. That’s why we have that
self-defense jury instruction. You don’t have to be 100 percent sure
before you defend yourself. You don’t. And not only that, and this
is even better, you don’t have to retreat. I didn’t make that all up.
It’s right there in the jury instruction. You can stand your ground.
He’s entitled to the benefit of that law, just like each and
every one of us are.
This is a fight, a sudden quarrel that rise [sic] to the level of
heat of passion that took place among a group of drunken people
that night, and the end result was tragedy, deadly, I concede.
(R., Vol. 2, p.1168 (Tr., p.963, L.4 – p. 966, L.15 (emphasis added); see Jury
Instrs. 29-31 (re: self-defense).) Based on the above-described ways in which
Adams’ self-defense theory was advanced at trial, his assertion that his trial
counsel failed to pursue a self-defense theory and argue against “malice
aforethought” is wholly dispelled by the record.
35

Adams has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel conceded he was
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and he has failed to show that his trial counsel
abandoned Adams’ self-defense theory; therefore, he has failed to show that his
trial counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial under Strickland.
4.

Adams Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Rejection
Of His Cumulative Error Claim

Adams argues that this Court “should consider all the deficient
performance and then determine whether the cumulative effect was prejudicial.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.39.) Some courts have applied the cumulative error doctrine
to the prejudice prong of Strickland. Wilson v. Simmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1122
(10th Cir. 2008). Under Idaho’s doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial
errors, harmless in themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair
trial.

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).

A

necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of
more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 407, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Ct.
App. 1998). Thus, if a petitioner fails to prove more than one incident of deficient
performance then there is no prejudice to cumulate.
Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 321 (Pa. 2011).

See Commonwealth v.

The ultimate question of Strickland

prejudice is whether the defendant was denied “a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Adams has failed to show his counsel committed two acts of deficient
performance, and therefore has failed to show any errors to cumulate. Even if
there had been multiple acts of deficient performance, Adams has failed to show
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that they would be cumulatively prejudicial. For these reasons, Adams has failed
to show cumulative error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of
dismissal and the order denying Adams’ motion for reconsideration.
DATED this 10th day of June, 2016.

__/s/ John C. McKinney_
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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